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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID W. HEATH and 
SUSAN M. HEATH, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
DONALD A. MOWER and FUTURE 
COMMUNITY HOMES OF UTAH, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16029 
---------------·----------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendants-Appellants, Donald A. Mower and Future Community 
Homes of Utah, Inc., were sued by the plaintiffs for breach of 
contract and for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer rendered a default judgment 
when the appellant was not present at a pre-trial hearing schedule 
for April 20, 1978, in favor of respondents for damages in the 
amount of $13,225.63. Appellants' subsequent motion to have the 
default judgment set aside was denied by Judge Palmer. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's denial 
to set aside the default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arises out of a contract between the respondents 
and appellant, Future Community Homes of Utah, Inc., (hereinafter 
"appellant corporation"). At the time this contract was entered 
into, appellant Mower was acting as agent for the appellant 
corporation. Before the construction contract was completed, 
there arose several difficulties and disagreements between the 
parties. Subsequently, the respondents filed suit against the 
appellants claiming that the appellant corporation had breached 
the contract, that appellant Mower had made fraudulent misrepre-
sentations to the respondents, that the corporation was a sham, 
and that the appellant Mower should, therefore, be personally 
responsible for the appellant corporation's breach of contract. 
When appellants failed to answer respondents' Complaint, 
a default judgment was entered against each of the appellants. 
This default judgment was subsequently set aside by the court 
because of the failure to serve the appellants. After this 
default judgment was set aside, respondents filed an Amended 
Complaint and appellants filed an Answer setting forth several 
affirmative defenses and a Counterclaim. On February 22, 1978, 
appellants' counsel, William Henderson, entered a withdrawal 
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of counsel. On March 2, 1978, an amended withdrawal of counsel 
was filed and copies were mailed to the appellant Mower at 3063 
A Northeast 57th Avenue, Vancouver, Washington. Subsequently, 
a pre-trial hearing was set for April 20, 1978. Notice of this 
hearing was sent by the court to William Henderson who had 
previously withdrawn as appellants' counsel and to appellant 
Mower at the above mentioned address. A copy of this notice 
was sent by certified mail to the above mentioned address, but 
this letter was returned unclaimed. Except for the aforementioned 
notice of pre-trial hearing, no other correspondence was sent 
to the appellant Mower. Appellant Mower, in the Affidavit attached 
to his Motion, specifically states that he received no notice of 
this hearing. 
On April 19, 1978, appellant Mower discovered, after a 
telephone conversation with his former wife, that a pre-trial 
hearing was being held the next day. This was the first time 
that the appellant Mower had any knowledge of the pre-trial hear-
ing set for April 20, 1978. Being unable to prepare for or attend 
this hearing, and in an attempt to avoid any adverse consequences 
resulting from him absence, he sent a mail-o-gram to the court 
indicating his inability to attend and his continued desire to 
pursue his defenses and counterclaims. This mail-o-gram was 
delivered on April 20, 1978, but was not filed until April 24, 1978. 
On April 20, 1978, the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer entered a 
default judgment in favor of the respondents. This action resulted 
- 3 -
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from defendant's absence at the pre-trial hearing. Subsequently, 
upon learning of the default judgment, the appellant Mower 
contacted his present attorney, Roger A. Livingston, to represent 
him in this matter. A motion was made to set aside the default 
judgment. This motion was made pursuant to Rules GOB (1) , (3), 
and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and was further 
based upon the Affidavit of the appellant Mower wherein he 
stated that he had no notice of the pre-trial hearing, that he 
had an Answer and Counterclaim on file which he intended to 
pursue, and that he had acted with due diligence in seeking 
relief from the default judgment. This motion to set aside the 
default judgment was heard on the 20th of July, 1978, but was 
denied. Because of the court's denial of this motion, the appel-




UNDER RULE GOB (1) AND (7) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE. 
Rule GOB (1) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or its legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons (1) mistake, inad-
vertance, surprise, or excusable neglect .. 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment." 
- 4 -
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It has been well established by this court that the above pro-
visions are to be liberally construed in order to allow a person 
his full day in court. This is especially true in the situation 
where a default judgment is entered. Cases of long-standing 
precedent, as well as recent cases, have established the principle 
that default judgments should be set aside to allow a full trial 
on the merits unless such action would result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. This basic principle 
was clearly set forth in the decision of this court in the recent 
case of Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. vs. Paul W. Larsen 
Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah,l975). In that case, a 
default judgment had been entered against the plaintiff for an 
alleged failure to prosecute. Finding that there might have been 
some reason for the plaintiff's failure to prosecute, the court 
made the following statement: 
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases 
with dispatch ... But it is even more 
important to keep in mind that the very 
reason for the existence of courts is to 
afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice between them. In 
conformity with that principle the courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief 
from default judgments where there is any 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result 
in substantial prejudice or ~n·ustice to 
the adverse party." Emphas~s added 
(Id. at 879) 
In order to understand the respect for and dedication to 
this principle by the Utah Supreme Court, it is necessary to 
review some of the leading cases that have established and 
- 5 -
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reaffirmed this principle. One of the leading cases was Utah 
Commercial and Savings Bank vs. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033 (Utah, 1898). 
This was a case in which the defendant was sued on a promissory 
note. The defendant was out of state, but had hired attorneys 
to represent him. After having a demurrer overruled, the 
defendant's attorneys wrote the defendant in California and 
stated that he would have to send them $100 before they could 
continue with his case. When the defendant never responded, 
the attorneys withdrew from the case. After their withdrawal, 
} 
a default judgment was entered against the defendant because 
of his failure to answer. When the defendant discovered that 
a default judgment had been entered against him, he retained 
another attorney who made a motion to have the default judgment 
set aside. When the court denied the motion, an appeal was 
made to this court. On appeal, the decision of the lower court 
was reversed. Relying heavily on the absence of the defendant 
from the state of Utah, his lack of information as to what was 
being done in his case, and the existence of facts that, if 
true, would constitute a good defense, the court ordered the 
default judgment be set aside. In its decision, the court stated: 
The policy of the law is that every 
man shall have his day in court before judgment 
shall be entered against him, and where a 
judgment by default has been entered, and 
within the proper time a good defense to the 
action in which the judgment was rendered is 
made to appear, and it is shown that the default 
was entered through excusable neglect or mistake, 
- 6 -
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the default will be vacated, and the judgment 
set aside to permit a trial on the merits ... 
The power of the court to set aside judgments 
by default is recognized and conferred in 
Section 3005, Rev. St. 1898 (now recognized 
in Rule 60B of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure], and should be liberally exercised, 
for the purpose of directing proceedings and 
trying causes upon their substantial merits; 
and where the circumstances which led to the 
default are such as to cause the court to 
hesitate, it is better to resolve the doubt 
in favor of the application, so that a trial 
may be secured on the merits." (Emphasis 
added) (Id. at 1036) 
As shown by the above quote, if there are any facts which 
should cause a court to hesitate in denying a party a trial 
on the merits, a default judgment should be set aside to allow 
such a trial to take place. 
The facts of the Trumbo case are very similar to the facts 
in the present case. In both cases, the court was confronted 
with a situation in which the defendant had been absent from the 
state while the proceedings that led to the default judgment 
were taking place. Additionally, in both cases, the defendants 
because they were attending to business did not receive the 
correspondencethatwould have kept them informed. Finally, in 
both cases the defendants alleged facts that, if true, would 
constitute good defenses to the complaints against them. In 
fact, in the present case the defendant has a valid Counterclaim 
on file that, if true, would allow him a recovery against the 
respondents. The seriousness with which this court viewed its 
duty to set aside the default judgment in such a case is evidenced 
- 7 -
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by this statement in the Trumbo case: 
" ... If in such a case as is presented in 
this record, a court of justice can grant no 
relief, then it would seem difficult to con-
ceive of a case where a court would be justi-
fied by default. Surely, it cannot be said 
that a person liable to be sued leaves his 
state at his peril, even when he has employed 
able counsel to care for his interests, lest 
perchance a judgment be taken by default which 
will leave him without remedy, regardless of 
any defense he may have. Such is not the law, 
and courts do not favor judgments by default 
" (Utah Commercial and Savings Bank vs. 
Trumbo, supra, at 1036) 
Another important case in which this court was asked to 
set aside a default judgment was Cutler vs. Haycock, 90 P. 897, 
(Utah, 1907). In that case the attorney for the defendant failed 
to timely file a demurrer to the plaintiff's Complaint. Relying 
on the existence of communication problems, this court reversed 
the refusal of the lower court to set aside the default judgment. 
In doing so, the court stated: 
Law and courts alike abhor a result 
that condemns a party unheard, and, unless 
the law unavoidably requires and justice 
demands it, where a party has not by his 
own inexcusable neglect deprived himself of 
the right, the courts should, and will, where 
equity permits, afford relief, to the end 
that a party may be given hearing. " 
(Emphasis added) (Id. at 901) 
Another reason the court set aside the default judgment was 
because it would not result in any inconvenience or loss to the 
adverse party. In fact, the court recognized, as is the situa-
tion in the case before this court, that the default judgment 
was unexpected. These circumstances were emphasized by the 
- 8 -
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court when it stated: 
" ... Upon the other hand, there is not the 
slightest intimation that the respondent would 
have suffered either inconvenience or loss of 
any kind by setting aside the default. If costs 
are involved, the court can always protect against 
those. This is not a case where a party at great 
expense and sacrifice of time had prepared for 
trial, and would be compelled to undergo it all 
again if the other party is permitted to defend; 
nor does it present a case where any evidence has 
been lost to the prevailing party. It is too 
manifest to admit of controversy that both the 
default and judgment were obtained at a time when 
neither was expected. (Emphasis added) (Id.) 
As with Trumbo, the Cutler case involved circumstances 
very similar to the case before this court. First, the Cutler 
case involved problems with communication which led to the default 
judgment. Though the exact nature of these problems differ, the 
principle remains the same. Inaction, resulting from circum-
stances where communication cannot be expected to be quickly 
and expeditiously made, was the basis for the court's decision. 
In 1907, the mails were not reliable enough to be the basis for 
a default judgment. The mail service today may be better than 
in 1907, though some would contest even that, but the distances 
involved again make it unreasonable to allow a default judgment 
to be taken. Second, both cases involve situations where setting 
aside the default judgment would not prejudice the adverse party 
or result in any inconvenience or loss. With these considerations 
in mind, this court should follow the decision of the court in 
the Cutler case. 
- 9 -
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Another case in which the court acknowledged that default 
judgments are not favored was Heath vs. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 
189 (Utah, 1962), where the lawfirm of Fabian & Clendenin was 
being sued for impropriety in having a default judgment set aside. 
This court, in finding that the actions of the lawfirm were not 
improper, emphasized the need for a full hearing on the merits: 
"Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice 
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or 
constitutional right to a judgment by default 
without a hearing on the merits. The courts, 
in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, 
where possible, a full and complete opportunity 
for a hearin on the merits of ever case .•. " 
Emphasis added I . at 190 
Statements have been made in several cases emphasizing 
that a decision whether or not to set aside a default judgment 
is within the discretion of the trial court. This principle 
is well established, but this court has been careful to define 
the scope of that discretion. The lower court is not given a 
free hand to refuse to set aside a default judgment. In fact, 
the large number of cases wherein lower courts have been reversed 
for failing to set aside default judgments indicates that such 
refusals will be closely scrutinized to see if there has been 
an abuse of discretion. In Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co., 
376 P.2d 951 (Utah, 1962), another case in which this court 
set aside the refusal of the lower court to set aside a default 
judgment, this court dealt directly with the question of discretion. 
As shown by the following quote, the court enunciated the principle 
- 10 -
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that a trial court should generally be inclined to set aside 
default judgments and that the failure to do so where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is 
endowed with considerable latitude of discretion 
in granting or denying such motions. However, it 
is also true that the court cannot act arbitrarily 
in that regard, but should be generally indulgent 
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of 
disputes so they can be settled advisedly and in 
conformity with law and justice. To clamp a judg-
ment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without 
a hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. 
It is fundamental in our system of justice that 
each party to a controversy should be afforded 
an opportunity to present his side of the case. 
For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as 
an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is reasonable justi-
fication or excuse for the defendant's failure to 
appear, and timely application is made to set it 
aside." (Emphasis added) (Id. at 952) 
In the prior case of Cutler, supra, this court specifically 
set forth one criterion to help lower courts in knowing when to 
set aside default judgments. 
" ... That the question whether a default and 
judgment should or should not be vacated is one 
to be passed on by the trial court, and that it 
rests within its sound discretion, has so often 
been declared to be the rule of practice that 
it has become elementary, and needs no citation 
of authorities. It is equally elementary that 
this discretion is to be applied to the facts 
as they appear in each case, and, in the exer-
cise of this discretion, the aim and object should 
be the promotion and furtherance of justice and 
the protection of the rights of all concerned. 
As has been well said, in all doubtful cases the 
general rule of courts ~s to ~ncl~ne towards grant-
ing relief from the default, and to bring about 
- 11 -
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a judgment on the merits. 1 Black on Judgments, 
§ 354; Cameron v. Carroll, 67 Cal. 500, 8 Pac. 
45; Wolff v. Canad~an Pac. Ry., 89 Cal. 332, 
26 Pac. 825; Watson v. S.F. & B. Ry. Co., 41 Cal. 
17. 11 (Emphasis added) (Cutler vs. Haycock, 
supra, at 900) 
An additional point which the court in Cutler made was that 
when there was a difference of opinion between the trial court 
and the court of review as to whether a reasonable basis for 
setting aside the default judgment existed, it should be set 
aside. 
. . While, as we have already stated, the 
mere difference of judgment between this court 
and the trial court may not be conclusive, still 
it raises a serious doubt, and in such a case 
a reasonable doubt is always resolved in favor 
of granting a trial upon the merits where none 
has been had ..• 11 (Id. at 901) 
In the case of Riddle vs. Quinn, 90 P. 893 (Utah, 1907), 
the court also addressed the issue of discretion: 
• All the authorities are to the effect 
that, whether the judgment be attacked by motion 
or by a proceeding in equity, the matter rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
The authorities further hold that in such proceed-
ings the courts will incline strongly toward 
bringing about a trial on the merits ... In 2 
Elliott's General Practice, the rule is stated 
in the following language: 'The appellate courts 
are much more reluctant to interfere where a 
default is set aside than in cases where the 
application is denied, as is evidenced by many 
decisions. The rule is analogous to that which 
prevails where new trials are granted, for, as 
is well known, appellate courts very seldom inter-
fere with an order granting a new trial. '" (Emphasis 
added) (Id. at 896) 
In this case the lower court, after finding that a notice of 
trial setting required by a district court rule had not been given, 
- 12 -
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set aside the default judgment. In line with its enunciation 
of the principle that appellate courts are less inclined to 
reverse the setting aside of a default judgment than to reverse 
a denial to set aside a default judgment, this court affirmed 
the lower court's decision setting aside the default judgment. 
Several decisions have been handed down by this court in 
which the court has refused to reverse lower court denials of 
motions to set aside default judgments. This in in line with 
the principle announced in Cutler, supra, p. 9, that a decision 
whether or not to set aside a default is to be made on the 
facts and circumstances of each case. The facts of those cases 
where the Supreme Court has affirmed the refusal of lower courts 
to set aside default judgments can easily be distinguished 
from the facts of the case presently before this court. In 
Peterson vs. Crosier, 81 P. 860 (Utah, 1905), the court refused 
to set aside the default judgment because the affidavit of the 
defendant showed a deliberate intention to abandon his defense. 
In the present case the affidavit of appellant Mower shows just 
the opposite: it shows that the appellants intend to affirmatively 
pursue their defenses and a counterclaim. In Warren vs. Dixon, 
260 P.2d 741 (Utah, 1953), this court refused to set aside a 
default judgment after finding that there was proper service of 
process in the case and that the defendant simply neglected to 
retain counsel until after the default judgment had been entered. 
- 13 -
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Again, this is very different from the present case where the 
appellants have retained counsel, have an Answer and Counterclaim 
on file, and have been confronted with a default judgment only 
after being besieged with communication and notice problems. 
Additionally, in Chrysler vs. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (Utah, 
1956), this court refused to set aside a default judgment when 
it found that the husband, instead of pursuing a divorce action 
which he had instituted in this state, removed himself to the 
state of Nevada and instituted a second action there. The court 
in that case specifically found that to set aside the default 
judgment would be prejudicial and unfair to the defendant. Finally, 
Granite School District vs. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah, 1963), the 
court refused to set aside a default judgment after finding that 
service was proper and that the defendant had actual notice of 
the action pending against him. 
POINT II 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BECAUSE OF THE 
RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO REQUIRE THE APPELLANTS BY WRITTEN NOTICE 
TO APPOINT ANOTHER ATTORNEY OR TO APPEAR IN PERSON. 
Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
and Circuit Courts in the State of Utah states as follows: 
"When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended 
or withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an 
attorney, the party to an action for whom such 
attorney was acting, must before any further 
proceedings are had against him, be required by 
the adverse party, by written notice to appoint 
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Nowhere does the record show that this required notice to the 
defendants was given. 
It has been established by this court that the parties, 
before a district court, are bound to observe the rules of 
practice established for the district courts. In an early 
case, Riddle vs. Quinn, supra, p. 14 this court affirmed the 
decision of the lower court setting aside a default judgment 
because of the failure of one of the parties to comply with a 
District Court Rule. The court stated: 
"We think, therefore, that the court had proper 
authority to promulgate Rule 21 and that liti-
gants in court and their attorneys were bound 
to observe its provisions." (Riddle, supra, at 
895) 
In a later case, Okerlund vs. Robinson, 281 P. 200, (Utah, 
1929), the court strongly reaffirmed this rule of law. In that 
case, the district court rule in question required the clerk of 
the court to notify each attorney of the time when their cases 
were set for hearing. Finding that this rule had not been 
complied with, this court reversed the decision in the district 
court to not set aside the default judgment and in its opinion 
stated as follows: 
"The force and effect of a rule lawfully adopted 
and promulgated by a court is stated in 7 R.C.L. 
title "Courts", p. 1027, as follows: 'Rules 
adopted by a court without exceeding the limits 
of its authority are often spoken of as having 
the effect of rules enacted by the legislature 
or positive law, and therefore as being obliga-
tory both on the court and on the parties.'" 
(Emphasis added) (Id. at 201) 
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The court also stated that: 
" . Where a rule such as No. 21 has been 
adopted and promulgated, attorneys are entitled 
to rely upon it." (Id.) 
This was reaffirmed in the fairly recent case of Central 
Finance Company vs. Kynaston, 452 P.2d 316 (Utah, 1969). 
This same rule of law has been established for the Federal 
District Courts. Thus, it has been held that rules of practice 
adopted by United States District Courts have the force and effect 
of law and are binding upon the parties and the court which 
promulgated them until they are changed in an appropriate manner. 
Woods Construction Co. vs. Atlas Chemical Industry, Inc., 337 F.2d 
888 (C.A. Okla., 1964). 
These cases clearly establish that a district court rule is 
binding upon the parties and upon the district courts. In the 
present case, the respondents failed to comply with Rule 2.5 
of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts. Pursuant to 
that provision, when a party's attorney withdraw~ the adverse 
party must serve written notice upon the party whose attorney 
has withdrawn requiring that party to appoint another attorney or 
to appear in person. As stated above, the respondents in this 
case failed to serve that notice upon the appellants. Therefore, 
the default judgment should have been set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The refusal of the lower court to set aside the default 
judgment constituted an abuse of discretion. The facts of this 
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case clearly exemplify the type of situation for which Rule 60B 
(1) and (7) was established. It would be rare that a more 
compelling case for the setting aside of a default judgment could 
be made. 
Additionally, the default judgment should be set aside because 
the respondents failed to comply with Rule 2.5 of the Rules of 
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State 
of Utah. Such rules have the force and effect of law and the 
failure to comply therewith constitutes reversable error. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
LIVINGSTON & McGARRY 
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Brief of Appellants, postage prepaid, to David E. Bean, attorney 
for plaintiffs-respondents, at 190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2, 
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